Status quo ante bellum, not administrative fiction: Why INEC’s interpretation undermines rule of law in ADC’s case, By Alex Ter Adum

In the unfolding leadership dispute within the African Democratic Congress (ADC), the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has adopted a position that raises profound legal and constitutional concerns. At the heart of the controversy lies a fundamental misinterpretation, whether deliberate or inadvertent, of the doctrine of status quo ante bellum, an error that now threatens to legitimise disorder while undermining judicial authority.

The Court of Appeal’s directive that parties maintain the status quo ante bellum was neither ambiguous nor novel. In law, the phrase has a settled and precise meaning: it requires a reversion to the last uncontested and lawful state of affairs before the dispute arose in court. It is restorative, not preservative.

The Nigerian appellate courts have consistently affirmed this position. In Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 at 287 , the Supreme Court defined status quo ante bellum as the state of affairs before the hostilities or dispute began. Similarly, in Oronti v. Onigbanjo (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1313) 449 at 481, the Supreme Court emphasised that the purpose of maintaining status quo is to preserve the rights of parties as they existed before the institution of the action.

The Court of Appeal reinforced this in Adewale v. Governor of Ekiti State (2006) LPELR-5991 (CA), where it held that an order of status quo ante bellum restores parties to their pre-dispute legal position.

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Equally important is the principle that courts will not preserve an illegality under the guise of maintaining the status quo. So status ante bellum cannot restore Nafiu Bala Gombe who had validly and legally resigned from office as Deputy National Chairman of ADC on the 18th May 2025 and began asserting his claim to the office after 29th July 2025, when the substantive Chairman Raph Nwosu resigned and NWC/NEC of the party appointed HE. Sen. David Mark to replace him.

In *Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 at 636,* the Supreme Court held that:
“The rule of law presupposes that the State is subject to the law… once there is a subsisting court order, it must be obeyed.”
Further, in *Governor of Ekiti State v. Ojo (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1007) 95,* *the Court of Appeal stressed that a party cannot rely on a self-created or unlawful situation as the status quo to be preserved.*

Against this settled legal backdrop, INEC’s apparent reliance on what may be described as a *“status quo actum* ”, that is, the state of affairs as it currently exists, represents a troubling departure from orthodox legal doctrine. This interpretation effectively freezes a contested situation rather than restoring the lawful order that preceded it. In doing so, it risks conferring legitimacy on actions that are themselves the subject of judicial scrutiny.

The absurdity of this position becomes evident when applied to the facts at hand. A key actor in the dispute, Nafiu Bala Gombe, is acknowledged to have resigned his position on 18th May 2025. That resignation is not merely a political footnote; it is a legally operative act that terminated whatever authority he previously possessed within the party structure. See *Yesufu v. Governor of Edo State (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 517,* where the court recognised that resignation takes immediate effect once communicated and accepted, thereby extinguishing the holder’s authority.

Months later, on 2nd September 2025, hostilities were initiated through litigation challenging the leadership of the party under David Mark. By that time, the operative status quo ante bellum, the last uncontested state before the dispute, was one in which the David Mark-led National Working Committee (NWC) was firmly in place, and Nafiu Bala Gombe had already exited the leadership structure.

To now suggest, as INEC’s position implies, that a former officeholder who had resigned months earlier can invoke a court order preserving status quo ante bellum to destabilise an existing leadership structure is to invert both logic and law. It is to treat a concluded resignation as provisional and to elevate a litigant’s grievance above established legal realities.

Such an approach undermines the very purpose of injunctive relief. In *Kotoye v. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419 at 441* , the Supreme Court held that *the purpose of an interim order is to prevent a situation where the subject matter of litigation is destroyed or altered irreversibly pending determination. It is not to legitimise disputed acts.*

Moreover, the courts have repeatedly warned against allowing parties to benefit from acts done in defiance of legal order or pending litigation. In *Ojukwu v. Military Governor of Lagos State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 806* , the Court of Appeal condemned self-help and emphasised that parties must await judicial determination rather than alter the status of the subject matter.

If administrative bodies such as INEC are permitted to reinterpret clear judicial directives to suit evolving circumstances, the authority of the courts is diminished, and the rule of law reduced to administrative discretion. This would be contrary to the constitutional order.

In the final analysis, the legal position admits of no ambiguity: the relevant status quo is that which existed before the dispute crystallised in court, not one manufactured in its aftermath. Any interpretation to the contrary is not merely erroneous, it is dangerous.

INEC, as a constitutional body, is bound by the discipline of the law. It cannot substitute established legal doctrine with administrative convenience. Where a court has ordered the maintenance of status quo ante bellum, compliance must be exact, not inventive.
To depart from it is to invite chaos. To uphold it is to preserve order.

■ Alex Ter Adum, PhD [alexadum45@gmail.com]