Ramaphosa and the test of African democracy: When institutions confront power, By Professor Ukertor Gabriel Moti

In my Ph.D. class in governance and leadership, at the Abuja Leadership Centre where we are dealing with the comparative analysis of governance and leadership in Africa, we just treated the intractable issue of institutions and accountability.

We noted how institutional integrity upholds and sustains accountability, but unfortunately, how this is lacking in many African countries including Nigeria. Institutions often exist in form and not performance.

It is within this context that I share my thoughts on a Constitutional matter coming out of South Africa away from the xenophobic tensions in that country.

The ruling by the Constitutional Court of South Africa against Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African president, is far bigger than the fate of one president. It is a profound institutional moment for Africa. It raises a difficult but necessary question across the continent: can African democracies build institutions strong enough to confront power without fear or compromise?

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At the heart of the judgment is a principle that many African states proclaim constitutionally but struggle to practice politically: that no public office, including the presidency, is above accountability.

The symbolism is striking. On the 30th anniversary of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the country’s apex court effectively reminded Parliament that constitutional obligations are not optional and political convenience cannot override institutional responsibility.

The court was not declaring Ramaphosa guilty. Rather, it was asserting something even more important for democratic governance: allegations against a sitting president must be subjected to lawful scrutiny, not buried through partisan maneuvering.

That distinction matters immensely.

In many African countries, accountability mechanisms exist formally but collapse when confronted with executive power. Anti-corruption agencies become selective. Legislatures become extensions of ruling parties.

Courts are pressured through patronage, intimidation, delayed appointments, or budgetary dependence. Oversight institutions often function aggressively against opposition figures but cautiously around incumbents.

South Africa’s case demonstrates what happens when institutions retain enough autonomy to resist that pattern.

The implications for governance in Africa are therefore enormous.

First, the ruling reinforces the idea that constitutionalism must prevail over personality cults. Across much of Africa, politics is excessively personalized. Leaders become synonymous with the state.

Criticism of government is interpreted as hostility toward the nation itself. Institutions are weakened because loyalty to individuals supersedes loyalty to constitutional processes.

The South African court disrupted that logic. It essentially told Parliament: your constitutional duty is not to protect the president; it is to protect the Constitution.That is the essence of mature democracy.

Second, the ruling exposes the central importance of institutional accessibility. Citizens, opposition parties, civil society organizations, journalists, and constitutional actors were able to activate legal processes that reached the highest court.

Accessibility here does not simply mean physical access to courts; it means the existence of functional democratic channels through which power can be challenged peacefully and legally.

In many African states, citizens often resort to protests, unrest, or international pressure because domestic institutions are inaccessible, compromised, or ineffective.

When courts function credibly, they become stabilizing mechanisms. They channel political crises into lawful adjudication rather than street confrontation.This is one reason strong institutions are essential not merely for democracy but for national stability itself.

Third, the case reveals the tension between party dominance and democratic accountability. The African National Congress (ANC) has historically enjoyed overwhelming political dominance rooted in its liberation legacy. Like many dominant parties across Africa, it faces a recurring temptation: protecting party power at the expense of institutional integrity.

This pattern is familiar continentally. In several African democracies, ruling parties use parliamentary majorities not to deepen accountability but to shield executives from scrutiny. Impeachment processes become mathematically impossible because legislators prioritize partisan survival over constitutional obligation.

The South African judgment challenges this model directly. It warns legislatures that parliamentary numbers cannot legitimize unconstitutional conduct indefinitely.

Can something similar happen in Nigeria?

Legally, yes. Institutionally and politically, it is far more complicated.

Nigeria’s Constitution provides mechanisms for legislative oversight, judicial review, and even impeachment of a president. The National Assembly possesses investigative powers. The judiciary has constitutional authority to interpret executive actions. Anti-corruption agencies theoretically possess prosecutorial independence.

But practical realities weaken these mechanisms significantly.

One major challenge is executive dominance over institutions. Nigerian presidents historically wield enormous influence through appointments, security structures, patronage networks, and fiscal control. This creates a political environment where institutions often calculate survival before asserting independence.

Another problem is the fragility of legislative autonomy. In theory, the National Assembly should serve as a check on executive excesses. In practice, political alignments, party interests, defections, patronage politics, and fears of political retaliation frequently dilute legislative courage. Oversight hearings may generate headlines without producing accountability.

The judiciary, while sometimes courageous, also operates under severe pressures: delayed reforms, allegations of selective justice, conflicting judgments in politically sensitive matters, and public perceptions of vulnerability to elite influence. Where public trust in judicial neutrality weakens, constitutional enforcement becomes fragile.

Nigeria therefore illustrates the difference between constitutional existence and constitutional effectiveness.

A constitution alone does not guarantee accountability. Institutions become strong only when political culture, civic vigilance, judicial independence, media freedom, and elite restraint converge to protect them.

This is where the South African case becomes deeply instructive for Africa.

Strong institutions are not built merely by drafting good constitutions. Almost every African state already possesses impressive constitutional language. The real challenge lies in institutionalizing restraint, teaching political elites that power must submit to law even when inconvenient.

Africa’s governance crisis is often less about absence of laws and more about selective application of laws.

The Ramaphosa matter also raises important questions about democratic maturity. A democracy becomes credible not when leaders are flawless but when institutions can investigate leaders without the state collapsing.

Accountability should not be mistaken for instability. In fact, suppressing accountability is what ultimately breeds instability because unresolved grievances accumulate beneath the surface.

There is also an important continental governance lesson here regarding legitimacy.

Modern African citizens. especially younger generations. increasingly demand transparent governance, institutional fairness, and equal application of the law. Liberation credentials, ethnic loyalties, and populist rhetoric no longer provide permanent immunity from scrutiny.
This shift is critical.

African societies are gradually transitioning from liberation-era political psychology toward performance-based democratic expectations. Citizens increasingly ask not who fought for freedom or democracy decades ago, but who governs responsibly today.

The South African ruling therefore symbolizes an evolving democratic consciousness in Africa: institutions matter more than personalities.

Yet the outcome will ultimately depend on whether institutions sustain their courage beyond the courtroom. Judicial rulings alone cannot transform governance if political actors neutralize accountability through procedural delay, elite bargaining, or partisan protection. The real test now lies with Parliament and the ANC itself.

Will constitutional duty override political convenience?

That question resonates far beyond South Africa. It speaks directly to Nigeria and many African states where institutions often stand at the crossroads between democratic principle and partisan survival.

Ultimately, the greatest lesson from this episode is that Africa’s future depends not on strong men but on strong systems. Nations become stable, prosperous, and democratic when institutions can question power without fear, when citizens can seek justice without intimidation, and when constitutions are treated not as symbolic documents but as binding social contracts.

The tragedy across much of Africa is not merely corruption or poor leadership. It is the persistent weakening of institutions designed to prevent both.

South Africa’s court has now demonstrated what institutional courage looks like. Whether the political system sustains that courage will determine not only Ramaphosa’s fate, but the deeper credibility of constitutional democracy in Africa itself.

■ Ukertor Gabriel Moti is Professor of Public Sector Management and Governance

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